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Expert testimony is an integral part of legal decision making.  It 
informs judges and juries about a wide variety of topics.  The 
assumption underlying its admission is that the average factfinder 
may lack enough knowledge about scientific or technical topics to 
make fully informed decisions in the absence of such testimony.  
Judges and juries are expected to be able to better understand these 
topics with the expert’s assistance.  However, there is concern over 
exposing the factfinder to unreliable expert testimony in 
circumstances where the factfinder may erroneously place a great 
deal of weight on the testimony in their decision-making.  Recent 
developments in the law regarding expert testimony have raised 
questions about how to limit the amount of unreliable expert 
testimony that is presented to the factfinders in order to prevent, as 
Professor Friedman puts it in his paper for this symposium, “jurors 
from being bamboozled by unreliable evidence.”3  Although these 
developments have theoretically altered the courts’ approach to 
expert testimony, significant questions, addressed by a number of 
papers in this symposium, still remain about whether the current 
approach attains an appropriate level of exclusion. For example, are 
admissibility standards too high or too low? 
In his paper, Professor Friedman advances a number of 
criticisms and suggestions about current expert testimony standards 
and practices.  We take these comments as a launching point for our 
discussion and, as will become evident, address them from an 
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empirical perspective by drawing from our on-going study of 
appellate court practices and analyses.  As Professor Friedman notes, 
the Supreme Court clarified the standards for the admissibility of 
expert testimony in the landmark decision Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4  The Court was called upon to determine the 
appropriate standard under which to evaluate scientific expert 
testimony.  The case concerned birth defects that were allegedly 
caused by Bendectin, an anti-morning sickness drug manufactured by 
Merrell Dow.5  The experts whose testimony was in question in the 
case were epidemiologists, whose testimony had been excluded at the 
trial court level.  Prior to the Daubert decision, the prevailing standard 
under which to evaluate the quality of scientific expert testimony was 
derived from the D.C. Circuit Court opinion in Frye v. United States.6  
Frye concerned the admissibility of a precursor to the modern 
polygraph.  The court determined that expert testimony should be 
admitted if it had gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community, which became known as the general acceptance test.7  
Decades later, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted.8  The 
Rules required that expert testimony assist the trier of fact, and that 
the expert must be qualified in order for the testimony to be 
admitted.9 
In Daubert, the Court considered the question of how the 
admissibility of scientific expert testimony should be evaluated.  The 
Court determined that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
superceded Frye as the predominant standard for admission.10  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence made no mention of Frye or of the general 
acceptance test.  Therefore, evaluating only general acceptance to 
determine if an expert should be admitted was improper.  As part of 
the admission decision, the Daubert Court required trial court judges 
to determine if the proffered testimony was reliable.11  This reliability 
evaluation should be conducted as part of the judge’s determination 
that the testimony meets the requirements of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
The Court suggested several factors by which judges could 
 
 4 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579(1993). 
 5 Id. at 582. 
 6 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 7 Id. at 1014. 
 8 FED. R. EVID. 702 
 9 Id. 
 10 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
 11 Id. at 589. 
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determine if an expert’s testimony was reliable or not.12  These factors 
included a consideration of whether the subject of the testimony was 
falsifiable or testable, whether the testimony was subjected to peer 
review or publication, and whether there was a known or potential 
error rate for the technique.  The Court also suggested that the 
general acceptance of the testimony could be evaluated.  This list of 
factors was not intended to be exclusive or to be applicable in every 
case, but it was intended to provide some limited guidance for the 
judges making these decisions. 
In the years following the Daubert decision, there was confusion 
among the lower courts and legal commentators concerning the 
applicability of the decision to non-scientific expert testimony.  The 
type of expert testimony provided in the Daubert case was highly 
scientific, and the suggestions made by the Court for evaluating 
reliability focused on scientific methodology.  Some reasoned that 
the mandates of the Daubert opinion did not apply to non-scientific 
evidence, and the reliability of non-scientific evidence did not have to 
be evaluated to determine admissibility.  Others reasoned that, 
although Daubert dealt specifically with scientific evidence, the 
Court’s suggestions applied equally to both scientific and non-
scientific testimony.  A number of commentators argued that 
reliability should be evaluated for all types of expert testimony, 
regardless of the applicability of the four suggested factors.13  These 
issues remained open until the admissibility of an engineer, in the 
form of a tire expert, was questioned in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.14  
In Kumho, the Court determined that the reliability of all expert 
testimony should be evaluated to determine admissibility. 
In his paper Professor Friedman challenges the idea that a high 
degree of reliability should be the determining factor in admissibility 
decisions concerning expert testimony, and he makes a strong case 
that even unreliable evidence (that is, evidence which produces 
relatively high error rates) can nonetheless be very useful to 
factfinders.  We are not inclined to dispute that proposition, and it is 
 
 12 Id. at 592-95. 
 13 David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under Daubert: Is It 
“Scientific,” “Technical,” or “Other” Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y. & L. 960 (1995); 
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Expert Testimony, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541 (1998). 
 14 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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clear from his paper that Professor Friedman does not object to 
admissibility practices and standards that encourage the introduction 
of reliable evidence with low error rates.  However, irrespective of 
one’s stance on these issues, it is clear that placing the responsibility 
for evaluating the scientific reliability of expert testimony on the trial 
court judges raises concerns.  Foremost among these concerns is 
whether or not judges have the ability to appropriately distinguish 
between reliable and unreliable testimony.15  Most judges lack 
training in scientific methodology, yet Daubert calls upon them to not 
only have knowledge about scientific methods, but also to apply that 
knowledge in their admission decisions.  Concerns about the 
interaction between judges and science are not solely a product of 
the Daubert opinion.  Prior to the Daubert decision, researchers 
investigated judicial attitudes toward and knowledge of scientific 
principles.  Research by Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett suggested 
that law school does not by itself prepare lawyers and future judges to 
recognize flaws in empirical research.16  That study indicated that 
incoming law students had a low level of skill in statistics and 
methodology (such as understanding the effects of a missing control 
group) and students demonstrated no improvement in the ability to 
apply statistical or methodological rules to everyday events during 
their third year of law school.17 
Surveys conducted on actual judges to determine their abilities 
to assess similar information suggest that judges lack the ability to 
evaluate scientific reliability.  For example, Manuto and O’Rourke 
conducted an exploratory survey to assess federal judicial knowledge 
of empirical methods, and the majority of the judges surveyed had 
little or no knowledge of social science methods.18  Judges rated the 
importance of several statistical measures, such as “validity.”  Judges 
also responded to open-ended questions about the appropriate role 
of training in empirical methods in a legal education and the value of 
scientific evidence in the courtroom.  Results indicated that although 
judges felt knowledge of social science methods “would be helpful . . . 
 
 15 Faigman and Saks, among others, observed that most judges lack training in 
scientific methods, which could make their gatekeeping duty more difficult.  See 
Faigman, supra note 13; Michael J. Saks, The Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving 
Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229 (2000). 
 16 Daniel R. Lehman et al, The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal 
Discipline and Thinking about Everyday-Life Events, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 431 (1988). 
 17 See id. at 440. 
 18 R. Manuto & S.P. O’Rourke, Federal Judges’ Perceptions of Social Research in Judicial 
Decision Making, 4 COMM. REP. 103 (1991). 
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but not essential,”19 the majority of the judges surveyed possessed little 
or no knowledge of social science methods.  Overall, the judges were 
disinterested or hostile toward social science.  Even among those 
judges having a positive attitude toward social science, the role of 
education in social science methodology was viewed as trivial.20 
Although there is a large body of research investigating the 
effect of expert testimony on jury decision-making, there is only a 
small but influential body of empirical research that has been 
conducted on judicial decision making about expert testimony.  This 
is likely because judicial decision making about expert testimony was 
not a crucial consideration until the Supreme Court’s recent 
opinions.  Among this body of research is a national survey of state 
trial court judges designed to assess their understanding of Daubert’s 
scientific factors, their willingness and ability to apply the Daubert 
factors.21  Judges’ demonstrated level of understanding of the factors 
was shockingly low.  While the majority of judges “clearly understand” 
peer review and general acceptance, only a small percentage of 
judges who thought falsifiability and error rate were useful factors 
clearly understood the meaning of those terms.22  Kovera and 
McAuliff conducted another study that manipulated the quality of 
the science being presented to the court, including some of the 
Daubert factors.23  While judges with some prior scientific training 
were somewhat sensitive to experimental validity, judges without 
scientific training were insensitive to variations in the quality of 
science presented before the courts.  For example, peer review was 
not influential in judges’ decisions to admit or exclude the evidence, 
and judges were not sensitive to experimenter bias and lack of 
control condition manipulations.24 
The results of these studies suggest that irrespective of whether 
reliability standards are set high or low, judges may have difficulty 
assessing the reliability of scientific evidence placed in front of them.  
The findings also support Professor Friedman’s arguments against 
the use of a reliability standard, and a return to reliance on whether 
the specialized knowledge in question “will assist the trier of fact to 
 
 19 Id. at 104. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001). 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Margaret B. Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and 
Evidence Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective 
Gatekeepers?, 85 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000). 
 24 Id. 
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understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”25  Of course, 
on the narrow question of whether judges can understand and apply 
reliability criteria, we cannot really say that the case is closed.  Most 
judges are probably capable of learning how to undertake the sort of 
analyses advanced by the Supreme Court in Daubert, and we might 
imagine that one instrument of such pedagogy is appellate court 
opinions in which our most experienced and sophisticated judges 
educate lower courts about appropriate methods for conducting 
reliability analyses.  In our analyses below, we examine pre- and post-
Daubert appellate opinions in an effort to ascertain the effect of 
Daubert on appellate instruction in reliability analysis. 
In the aftermath of these developments, the question still 
remains as to whether the standards applied to expert admissibility 
are too high, thereby prohibiting the admission of reliable evidence, 
or too low, permitting the admission of unreliable evidence.  Indeed, 
in light of the studies noted above, it is even fair to ask whether trial 
courts are able to differentiate more reliable evidence from less 
reliable evidence.  If they are not, one might ask if they instead are 
relying on other standards such as the one favored by Professor 
Friedman in his symposium paper—whether the specialized 
knowledge in question helps “the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  In our other research on 
appellate court decisions about expert evidence we have observed 
that courts evaluate expert evidence in criminal trials in a manner 
that is at times quite harsh and at other times without any regard for 
demonstrations of the reliability of that evidence.26  Professor 
Friedman has advanced the proposition that variability in standards 
for admission of expert evidence in criminal cases is defensible.  His 
position is that “[w]hatever the tests for admissibility may be, they 
“should be very lenient for criminal defendants, and tougher for 
prosecutors, with the standards for civil litigants somewhere in 
between.27”  Friedman defends this proposition by 1) noting that 
prosecutors stand in a very different position than that of an accused 
in such matters as discovery and party resources, 2) arguing that 
because prosecutors as “repeat players” face tougher admissibility 
standards for their evidence, they may be induced to produce better 
evidence, and 3) recognizing the differential in stakes (reflected in 
 
 25 Friedman, supra note 3, at 1060. 
 26 See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effect of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 (2002) 
(comparing the admission rates for different types of experts in criminal cases). 
 27 See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1047. 
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the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of persuasion that rests on 
a shared perception that the social cost of an erroneous conviction is 
many times greater than the social cost of an erroneous acquittal). 
In this vein, we believe that a detailed comparison of trial and 
appellate courts’ treatment of two types of testimony commonly 
provided in criminal cases, police officer and psychologist testimony, 
is particularly revealing.  Expert testimony by police officers is 
required for the prosecution of many crimes, particularly drug-
related crimes.  Psychologists often testify in criminal cases, providing 
information about defendants’ psychiatric diagnoses or providing 
social framework evidence to aide the factfinder in appropriately 
evaluating the evidence in the case.28 
In contrast to the various issues raised about other types of 
experts, there has been very little criticism of police officers testifying 
as experts.  However, among the criticisms of the courts’ treatment of 
police officers is Schumm’s—that courts admit police officers without 
any real consideration devoted to their reliability.29  Others have 
argued, as a point of criticism, that when courts admit police officers 
as experts, they do so using precisely the admissibility criteria 
advanced by Professor Friedman in his paper for this symposium, that 
is, courts refer only to assisting the trier of fact or qualifications as 
criteria for admission.30  Courts do not apply Daubert to police, and 
courts do not assess the reliability of police.31  The lack of broader 
critical commentary about police officers as expert witnesses may be 
attributed to a number of factors.  Our suspicion is that a primary 
factor is that police officers are viewed as inherently reliable by 
courts.  Survey studies of jurors indicate that police officers testifying 
as experts are perceived as highly likeable, understandable, 
 
 28 Social framework evidence refers to psychological research or group data that 
is unrelated to the case at hand.  It is provided to give the jury an understanding of 
the facts in issue.  An example of social framework evidence would be an expert 
discussing the body of research on eyewitness reliability, which is unrelated to any 
single case, in order for the jury to properly evaluate the credibility of the eyewitness 
in a specific case.  Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of 
Social Science in the Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). 
 29 See Jeffery M. Schumm, Precious Little Guidance to the “Gatekeepers” Regarding 
Admissibility of Nonscientific Evidence: An Analysis of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 27 
FL. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 879-80 (2000). 
 30 See David L. Faigman, Embracing the Darkness: Logerquist v. McVey and the 
Doctrine of Ignorance of Science is an Excuse, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 97 (2001); see also 
Jennifer Laser, Inconsistent Gatekeeping in Federal Courts: Applications of Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1333 (1997). 
 31 See Schumm, supra note 29. 
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believable, and confident, more so than other types of experts.32  It is 
not much of stretch to imagine than judges share these perceptions. 
On the other hand, courts and commentators have been highly 
critical of psychologists testifying as experts.  Psychological testimony 
been described by deVyver as a dangerous type of non-scientific 
evidence fraught with bias.33  Holly has characterized the testimony as 
inherently unreliable.34  Faigman and others have raised questions 
about the admissibility of syndrome testimony post-Daubert.35  Among 
the issues raised concerning syndrome evidence is the applicability of 
the Daubert factors, which are based on empirical science, to this type 
of testimony, which is largely based on clinical observation and 
theory. 
I.  ILLUMINATIONS FROM EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL DECISION 
MAKING IN CRIMINAL APPELLATE CASES 
Based on such commentary, we can formulate several hypotheses 
about how courts evaluate police officer and psychological expert 
testimony and how those evaluations might have changed after 
 
 32 For example, Linz and Penrod asked jurors to rate different types of witnesses 
from fifty trials, including defendants, victims, eyewitnesses, police, and experts.  
Overall, police officers and experts were rated as the least dishonest and were rated 
as the most likable, understandable, believable, and confident.  Daniel Linz & Steven 
Penrod, The Use of Experts in the Courtroom, SOCIAL PSYCHOL. (1982).  Saks and Wissler 
also compared jurors’ ratings of different types of witnesses, including a variety of 
expert witnesses.  The types of witnesses included in the survey were doctors, 
chemical/drug analysts, appraisers/appraisers, handwriting analysts, psychiatrists, 
psychologists, firearms experts, polygraph technicians, police, and eyewitnesses.  
Participants rated their agreement with, the honesty of, and the competence of all of 
the witnesses and indicated whether they had a positive experience with, a negative 
experience with, or no experience with each of the witness types.  Doctors, chemists, 
and firearms experts were rated as the most agreeable, honest, and competent.  
Accountants, eyewitnesses, psychologists, psychiatrists, and police were rated the next 
highest in agreeability, honesty, and competence.  Polygraph technicians and 
handwriting analysts were rated the lowest on all these measures.  Michael J. Saks & 
R.L. Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimony: Surveys of the Law and of 
Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 435 (1984).  The results of these surveys indicate that 
police officers are trusted as experts, perhaps more so than psychologists. 
 33 See K. Issac deVyver, Opening the Door but Keeping the Lights Off: Kumho Tire Co. 
v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert Test to Nonscientific Evidence, 50 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 177, 198 (1999). 
 34 See J.L. Holly, Why the Daubert Standard Should Apply to Both Expert Opinions 
Based Upon “Technical” or “Other Specialized Knowledge” and to Expert Opinions Based Upon 
“Science” or a “Scientific Method”, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 35 See, e.g., Krista L. Duncan, “Lies, damned lies, and statistics?” Psychological Syndrome 
Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert,. 71 IND. L.J. 753 (1996); Faigman, supra note 
13; David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of 
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in 
Criminal Trials: To Junk or not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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Daubert and Kumho.  From one perspective, we might anticipate that 
the number of police officers and psychologists who are admitted as 
experts would change after Daubert or Kumho.  Given that many 
experts that testify in criminal cases are considered to be non-
scientific, we might hypothesize that experts in criminal cases, 
including police officers, will be excluded more often after Kumho as 
the courts start evaluating the reliability of non-scientific testimony.36  
On the other hand, it is possible that when courts are evaluating 
police officers, their primary criteria employed may be the “assisting 
the trier of fact” criterion (variously promoted and criticized by 
commentators) and the qualifications of the police officer.37  If true, 
when judges are determining the admissibility of police officers, they 
will not use the Daubert factors to determine reliability of police 
officers and may not evaluate reliability at all.38 
In order to investigate courts’ evaluation of police officers and 
psychologists in a systematic manner, we identified appellate court 
cases concerning the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal 
cases.39  Appellate court cases were selected for several reasons 
including their widespread availability, their inclusion of information 
about trial court decisions, and their potential to demonstrate 
broader trends in admissibility.40  The timing of the decisions ranged 
 
 36 David E. Rovella, ‘Kumho’ Could Affect Criminal Cases, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 12, 1999, 
at A5.(arguing that Kumho would exert its greatest exclusionary effect in criminal 
cases because much of the evidence is non-scientific, such as police officers). 
 37 See Faigman, supra note 29; see also Laser, supra note 29; Schumm, supra note 
28. 
 38 See Schumm, supra note 28. 
 39 The search terms used to identify relevant cases in the Westlaw database were: 
“admiss! /5 expert or witness.” 
 40 As with all empirical research, there are some limitations to the research 
presented here.  Appellate court decisions have the potential to indicate overall 
trends in courts’ reasoning about expert testimony.  Presumably, trial courts should 
be attentive to appellate decision making.  In light of their potential influence on 
trial court decision making, several authors have highlighted the importance of 
trends in appellate court decision making in the investigation of expert admissibility 
including David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and 
Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997); Richard D. Friedman, Squeezing Daubert Out of 
the Picture, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1047 (2003); Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks 
the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 987 (2003).  However, Daubert and Kumho were directed at trial court 
judges and the research was conducted on appellate court cases.  This results in two 
important limitations.  First and most important, the use of appellate court cases 
results in a selection bias in the dataset.  Not all cases are appealed, and the reasons 
for raising an appeal or not may be wholly unrelated to the quality of the expert’s 
testimony.  This may be particularly true in criminal cases.  For example, the 
prosecution is generally barred from post-acquittal appeals of trial court decisions.  
Therefore, the improper admission of a defense expert or the exclusion of a 
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from five and a half years before Daubert to two years after Kumho.41  
Cases were coded for content on variables including the type of 
testimony provided by the expert, the appellate court admission 
decision, the discussion devoted to the potential evaluative criteria, 
and the influence of these potential evaluative criteria on the 
admission decision.  Evaluative criteria included the requirements of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert factors.42  Only cases 
containing substantive discussion of the admissibility of expert 
testimony were included in the database.  Although we will only be 
presenting the results from a selected subset of experts testifying in 
criminal cases, the larger study included both civil and criminal 
experts of all types.  Over 1800 cases have been coded in the research 
to date. 
Of the experts testifying in criminal cases, 265 were police 
officers.  The vast majority of the police officers whose testimony was 
challenged provided testimony about the behavior of drug dealers.  
This testimony included information about the structure and 
membership in drug organizations, the modus operandi of drug 
dealers, and the habits of drug users.  Often, the police officer 
testifying as an expert was also the detective who investigated the 
case. 
There were a total of 376 psychologists providing expert 
testimony in the criminal cases that were appealed during the time 
period investigated.  Three hundred and eight of these experts were 
classified as clinical psychologists, who based their opinions and 
testimony on data from clinical observation.  The clinical 
psychologists in the database testified on a broad range of topics 
including syndromes, child sexual abuse, insanity, competence, 
disorders, and dangerousness.  Sixty-eight of the psychologists were 
classified as experimental psychologists, who based their testimony on 
information gained from empirical research.  The vast majority of the 
experimental psychologists testified about issues relating to 
eyewitness reliability. 
 
prosecution expert may never appear in the dataset.  Second, except for the 
information about a trial court’s decision provided in appellate court opinions we 
are required to make inferences about how trial court judges make their decision. 
 41 The cases included in the current analysis include both state and federal 
appellate court cases until the time of the Kumho decision.  All cases included that 
were decided after Kumho are from federal courts only.  Coding and analysis of the 
state appellate court cases after Kumho is still underway.  Therefore, conclusions 
regarding the effects of Kumho should be regarded with caution. 
 42 For a more detailed explanation of the procedures used and the variables that 
were coded, please refer to Groscup et al., supra note 26. 
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Questions have been raised about whether courts are being 
critical of expert testimony in criminal cases and, if so, whether courts 
are being critical enough of these experts.  One piece of evidence of 
how critical courts are of experts in criminal cases is the rate at which 
the appellate courts indicate that trial courts should have admitted 
testimony that is the subject of an appeal.  In our previous research 
on all criminal experts, 69.1% (N = 693) of criminal experts before 
and after Daubert were admitted.43  This provides a general point of 
reference with which to compare the admissibility of particular types 
of experts. 
Police officers, who are admitted frequently, represent the high 
end of the continuum of admissibility.  Police officers were admitted 
85.7% of the time overall.  At this rate they are, as we shall see, 
admitted significantly more often than both types of psychological 
experts in criminal cases.44  This rate of admission was not affected by 
Daubert or Kumho in that the percentage of cases in which the 
appellate courts favored admissibility did not vary significantly in 
comparisons of pre- versus post-Daubert and post-Kumho.  There was 
no change in the rates of admission for police officers after Daubert or 
Kumho.  Police officers continued to be admitted at a consistently 
higher rate than all other experts over time.  This provides some 
evidence that courts are not as critical of police as experts. 
Do courts demonstrate as much affection toward other experts 
as they direct toward police officers, or are courts more critical of 
other types of expert testimony in criminal trials?  In contrast to the 
courts’ positive reception of expert testimony by police officers, 
courts have been less kind to their psychologist counterparts.  
Psychologists were only admitted 49.7% of the time overall, as 
compared to the 85.7% admissibility rate for police officers, a 
statistically significant difference.  However, this overall number is 
not representative of how courts differentially treated clinical 
psychologists and experimental psychologists.  The negative 
reception of psychological testimony is particularly apparent in the 
courts’ approach to experimental psychologists’ testimony.  This is 
the type of testimony in a criminal case that is least likely to be 
admitted, with only 22.1% of these experts admitted at the appellate 
level.  Clinical psychologists were admitted significantly more often 
than experimental psychologists.  55.8% of the clinical psychologists 
were admitted.  As with police officers, there was no change in rates 
of admission after Daubert or after Kumho for either clinical or 
 
 43 See id. 
 44 X
2
 (2) = 115.52, V = .43, p < .001 
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experimental psychologists.  Experimental psychologists continued to 
be admitted at a consistently lower rate than other experts over all 
time periods.  These rates provide some evidence that courts are 
more critical of psychologists as experts, particularly experimental 
psychologists. 
Because the qualifications of the expert can be an influential 
determinant of admissibility, an important consideration for judges 
may be the basis for the expert’s knowledge.  The source of the 
expert’s knowledge could be another fact or which distinguishes 
police officer testimony from psychological testimony.  The lack of 
consideration of police officer reliability could have been due to the 
type of testimony and qualifications brought to the court by police.  
Police officers are viewed as gaining their expertise from experience, 
which is consistent with the arguments of both Faigman and 
Risinger.45  In fact, their testimony was significantly more likely to be 
based on experience than either type of psychologist (see Figure 1).  
They were also likely to base their knowledge on case specific 
experience, such as their role as the investigator in the case for which 
they are providing the expert testimony, significantly more so than 
for experimental psychologists.  Clinical psychologists were the most 
likely to have their testimony based on case specific experience, such 
as their role as the therapist for the defendant or the victim in the 
case.  Both types of psychologists were more likely than police to base 
their knowledge on their education.  However, experimental 
psychologists were the most likely to derive their knowledge from a 
body of research, which is consistent with an empirical approach to 
psychological issues. 
Courts may differentially evaluate police and psychologists on 
many of the potential criteria with which they can determine 
admissibility.  We sought to ascertain which of those criteria and 
evaluations might explain the differences in admissibility rates.  We 
recorded when admission criteria were specifically stated by the court 
to be “met” or “not met” by the testimony.  Results are presented in 
Figures 2 and 3.  Overall, we observe that courts are frequently 
evaluating all three types of expert testimony with the Federal Rules 
of Evidence requirements, but there is little use of reliability and the 
Daubert factors.  Several differences are observed between the 
evaluations of police and psychologists.  In addition to being the most 
frequently admitted type of expert in criminal cases, police were 
 
 45 See Faigman, supra note 20; see also D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert 
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 
(2000). 
 2003 STANDARDS FOR EXPERTS IN CRIMINAL CASES 1153 
positively evaluated on the many potential evaluative criteria.  For 
example, police officers were generally found qualified to testify as 
experts and their testimony itself was generally found to assist the 
trier of fact.  On the other hand, experimental psychologists were 
negatively evaluated in general.  For example, courts reasoned that 
the testimony from experimental psychologists did not assist the trier 
of fact.  Courts’ assessments of jurors’ common knowledge provides 
one explanation for courts’ reasoning that police assist the trier of 
fact and experimental psychologists do not.  Courts were significantly 
more likely to say experimental psychology was already in the jurors’ 
common knowledge (37.8%) than police officers (8.1%).46  If a judge 
determined that the jury already knew the content of the expert’s 
testimony then that testimony would appear to be unhelpful to the 
trier of fact. 
Although it is informative to investigate the topics judges 
discussed that were related to admissibility, determining which if any 
of these factors predicts the admissibility of police officers and 
psychologists is more informative.  Regression models were built to 
determine the predictive utility of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
of the Daubert factors.  In this analysis, the outcome variable, or the 
thing that we are trying to predict was the appellate admission 
decision (higher values indicate the testimony was admitted).  
Predictor variables are the criteria that will potentially determine 
whether or not the testimony is admitted—or the value each expert is 
assigned on the outcome variable, admission.  The predictor variables 
used in this analysis were the timing of the case (with higher values 
indicating the case was decided after Daubert and Kumho), indices of 
the influence of several evaluative criteria, and the interactions 
among the timing of the case and the indices, which determine if 
courts changed the criteria by which they determined admissibility 
over time.  The potential evaluative criteria included the Federal 
Rules of Evidence requirements (relevance, qualifications, assisting 
the trier of fact, and prejudicial impact), the Daubert factors (general 
acceptance, falsifiability, peer review, and error rate), and general 
reliability. 
The selected criteria significantly predicted admissibility for all 
three types of experts.  The predictors in the model accounted for 
42.6% of the variance in admission of expert testimony by police 
officers, 56.4% for clinical psychologists, and 75.5% for experimental 




 (4) = 44.23, V = .18, p < .001. 
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officers, clinical psychologists, and experimental psychologists were 
not more or less likely to be admitted after Daubert or Kumho.  The 
Rules’ requirements account for most of the variance in admissibility.  
Assisting the trier of fact, qualifications, and relevance were the best 
predictors of admissibility.  Overall, the Daubert factors and general 
reliability did not significantly predict admissibility.  None of these 
factors individually predicted admissibility for police and 
experimental psychologists.  However, general acceptance did predict 
admissibility for clinical psychologists.  There was no change over 
time in courts’ use of the evaluative criteria, as evidenced by the 
interactions failing to predict admission. 
In summary, police officers and clinical psychologists provide 
experience-based expert testimony, and experimental psychologists 
rely more heavily on a body of research and their education, as 
observed by commentators.  Police officers are admitted as experts at 
the appellate court level at a very high rate, more frequently than any 
other type of expert, in contrast to experimental psychologists who 
are often excluded.47  Surprisingly, the rates of admission of police 
officers and psychologists were not affected by the Daubert and Kumho 
decisions.  Police officers and psychologists are evaluated by the 
Rules’ requirements—where police assist the trier of fact and 
experimental psychologists do not.  Courts are not undertaking an 
analysis of the reliability of police officer testimony or psychologists 
when determining their admissibility. 
II.  POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING ABOUT 
POLICE AND PSYCHOLOGISTS 
Several factors could explain courts’ positive evaluation of police 
officers and their apparent preference for admitting them over 
experimental psychologists.  One motivating factor could be the 
desire to assure the successful prosecution of criminals, with a 
particular interest in removing drug dealers from the streets.  If 
courts state that police officers are unreliable in some instances, it 
may become difficult to prosecute drug dealers because police 
reliability will always be challenged.  Recent legal developments 
surrounding the reliability of fingerprinting is an example of the 
problems associated with the exclusion of typically powerful and 
heavily relied upon prosecutorial evidence.48  On the other hand, 
 
 47 Risinger also argued this point and presented evidence from cases discussing 
these types of experts as support.  See Risinger, supra note 45. 
 48 See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 492 (E.D. Pa., 2002); see also R. 
Erik Lillquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
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eyewitness reliability experts typically testify for the defense to 
counteract the influence of a powerful and often unreliable piece of 
prosecution evidence, the eyewitness identification.  This distinction 
implies that there may be a preferential treatment given to experts 
who testify for the prosecution as compared to those who testify for 
the defense. 
In fact, prosecution experts were admitted significantly more 
often than defense proffered experts (see Table 1 for percentages).  
Not only is there a distinction between the admission of prosecution 
and defense experts overall, there is also a tendency for prosecution 
experts to be admitted more frequently than defense experts within 
each of the selected types of experts (see Table 1 for percentages).  
Police officers and clinical psychologists were both significantly more 
likely to be admitted when proffered by the prosecution.  Although 
the difference between the admission rates of experimental 
psychologists testifying for the prosecution and the defense was not 
significant, the high rate of admission for these experts when they 
testified for the prosecution is worthy of note.  This distinction in 
rates of admission between prosecution and defense proffered 
experts agrees with findings of Risinger, that criminal defendants are 
less lucky in expert testimony appeals.49 
Another reason for the overwhelming admission of police 
officers might be that judges, like laypersons and commentators, feel 
police officers are inherently reliable and psychologists are inherently 
unreliable.  As for experimental psychologists, judges may truly 
believe that the problems with eyewitness reliability are so well known 
that it is in jurors’ common knowledge, which would explain their 
persistent reasoning that this type of testimony does not assist the 
trier of fact.  They may also truly believe that drug dealers are outside 
the ken of the average juror, requiring expert testimony in order to 
educate the jury. 
One common explanation for these results would be that judges 
are unable to evaluate the reliability of expert testimony, including 
police officers and psychologists.  From the data presented, it is clear 
that judges are not conducting Daubert reliability analyses of police or 
psychologists to determine their admissibility.  Past research on 
judicial abilities to discern reliable from unreliable science indicates 
that judges may not be able to undertake this task without training in 
 
1189 (2003); Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science 
(Especially Fingerprint Expert Testimony), 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1167 (2003). 
 49 See Risinger, supra note 45. 
 1156 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:1141 
scientific methodology,50 which may explain why reliability is not 
assessed for these experts.  This has important implications for the 
admission of these experts and for the level at which they are 
scrutinized.  There is a lack of empirical research investigating the 
reliability of police officers, or demonstrating the need for the 
content of their testimony regarding drug dealing.  If judges were 
able to and did evaluate their reliability, police might not fare as well 
during the admission process.  This may also be true of some forms of 
clinical psychological testimony that is not based on any empirical 
research.  Ironically, the one type of testimony evaluated herein that 
has substantial empirical data regarding its reliability is experimental 
psychology, which is the most frequently excluded without regard to 
its reliability.  Perhaps experimental psychologists would fare better 
in admission if judges actually weighed reliability more heavily in 
their decisions. 
III.  WHITHER THE STANDARDS? 
So, the question remains: are the standards for the admissibility 
of expert testimony too high or too low in criminal cases?  Based on 
our analyses of the treatment of police and psychological experts, the 
answer to the question will probably depend on who is answering the 
question.  By taking an objective look at how courts are using their 
own standards, it is difficult to determine where the bar is set at all, 
let alone whether or not it is too high.  It is not clear that courts are 
evaluating reliability as the Supreme Court suggested, though it is 
clear that Daubert analyses are not a significant feature of admissibility 
analyses.  If viewed in light of the positions advanced by Professor 
Friedman in his symposium paper, one might actually conclude that 
courts are applying a sufficiency analysis of the type advanced by 
Professor Friedman.  However, there is little evidence that the 
analysis applies a higher standard to prosecution evidence as 
advocated by Professor Friedman. 
A.  Experimental Psychologists 
To determine if the standards are too high, too low, or just right 
we might ask the experts themselves.  If we were to ask experimental 
psychologists and eyewitness-reliability experts in particular, they 
would probably say courts are excluding this type of testimony too 
often.  Survey research that has probed eyewitness reliability experts’ 
 
 50 See the discussion of survey and experimental research on judicial abilities to 
evaluate reliability, supra at 1144-46.  See also infra Part III. 
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opinions about the state of the research in the area indicates there is 
a consensus about the findings on a number of issues.51  The majority 
of experts believe that many important factors that might affect 
eyewitness reliability are not within jurors’ common knowledge, and 
they agree that the purpose of experts in this area is to educate the 
jury and not to advocate for a particular party.52  Further evidence of 
the need for this type of testimony and that courts may be incorrect 
in assuming that it is already within the common knowledge of the 
jury, is provided by research on laypersons’ understanding of 
eyewitness reliability.  Surveys that have probed the factfinders’ level 
of knowledge have shown that eyewitness reliability is outside of their 
common knowledge.53  Additionally, mock jury research 
manipulating the presence of eyewitness expert testimony supports 
the contention that jurors are generally insensitive to the factors that 
indicate an eyewitness is unreliable, but expert testimony sensitizes 
the jury to these issues.54 
 
 
 51 See Saul M. Kassin & K.A. Barndollar, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony: A 
Comparison of Experts and Prospective Jurors, 22 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1241 (1992); 
see also Saul M. Kassin et al., On the “General Acceptance” of Eyewitness Testimony Research: 
A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 405 (2001). 
 52 See Kassin et al., supra note 511. 
 53 Brigham and Bothwell tested the common knowledge of jurors about 
identifications by asking participants to estimate correct identification rates from 
lineups and to predict the results of studies on identification, such as the 
confidence/accuracy relationship, the effects of stress, and the proper weight to be 
afforded to eyewitness testimony.  Participants performed poorly at estimating 
research results and overestimated the rate of correct lineup identification.  These 
results demonstrated the schism between jurors’ common knowledge of eyewitness 
accuracy and the expert knowledge derived from research on identification.  John 
Brigham & R. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of 
Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983).  In another study, jurors’ 
knowledge of eyewitness identification was directly compared to experts’ knowledge.  
See Kassin et al., supra note 511.  Participants answered true, false, or don’t know to 
questions previously asked of experts.  Disagreement between experts and novices 
was observed on fifteen  of the twenty-one items in the survey, including questions 
about lineup procedures, instructions, confidence, gender effects, hypnosis, time of 
exposure to the target, memory, and cross-racial identification.  These areas of 
disagreement indicate a lack of knowledge of eyewitness identification issues by the 
jurors relative to the experts.  See Kassin et al., supra note 511.  The authors in both 
studies concluded that there is a need for expert testimony on eyewitness issues to 
educate the jury. 
 54 See Brian L. Cutler et al., Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical 
Analysis, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (1989); see also Brian L. Cutler et al., Nonadversarial 
Methods for Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence, 20 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1197 
(1990); Brian L. Cutler et al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 311 (1989). 
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B.  Police Officers 
If we were to ask police officers whether they believed the 
standards applied to the admission of their testimony were too high 
or too low, the likely response would be that “this standard is just 
right!”  As one of the most frequently admitted types of experts, how 
could they complain?  The limited commentary that has been critical 
of their unquestioned admission indicates that this preferential 
treatment may be inappropriate.  However, we know of no empirical 
research that has addressed the reliability of police officer testimony 
in this area that would support this contention. 
C.  Clinical Psychologists 
Clinical psychologists might have a similarly positive opinion 
about the treatment of their own testimony, at least relative to their 
counterparts, the experimental psychologists.  However, if we were to 
ask legal scholars about clinical psychological testimony, the concerns 
that have been expressed about this type of testimony would indicate 
that these types of experts should be evaluated more critically.  One 
of the major focal points of the post-Daubert commentary on 
psychological experts was the effect Daubert would have on the 
admissibility of experts testifying about psychological syndromes.  
The main criticism of syndromes used as evidence is that they have 
not been scientifically validated or are unreliable.55  The evidence of 
their existence has been provided mostly by clinicians’ observations 
in their therapeutic practices.  Little empirical research has been 
conducted on these syndromes to determine if their associated 
symptoms occur significantly more often in people who have suffered 
a relevant trauma than in people who have experienced no trauma.  
Because, in this view, syndromes generally lack scientific validity, 
many commentators predicted that they would not survive a Daubert-
type scientific reliability analysis and would, therefore, be 
inadmissible after Daubert.56 
 
 55 See Teresa S. Renaker, Evidentiary Legerdemain: Deciding When Daubert Should 
Apply to Social Science Evidence, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1996); see also Daniel W. Shuman 
& Bruce D. Sales, The Impact of Daubert and its Progeny on the Admissibility of Behavioral 
and Social Science Evidence, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (1999); Jennifer Sparks, 
Admissibility of Expert Psychological Evidence in Federal Courts, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315 
(1997). 
 56 See Duncan, supra note 35, see also Faigman & Wright, supra note 35  For 
example, Richardson and colleagues argued that it would be difficult for 
psychological syndrome evidence to meet the Daubert factors of falsifiability and error 
rate, but that courts frequently rely on general acceptance when evaluating the 
admissibility of this type of testimony.  James Richardson et al., The Problems of 
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However, the need for this testimony to educate the jury on 
several sensitive issues would indicate that clinical testimony should 
be admitted more often than it is.  Survey research on jurors 
regarding their knowledge of child sexual abuse and rape indicates 
that important psychological effects of these crimes are not within 
their common knowledge.57  Jurors systematically lacked knowledge 
in these areas, and the experts agreed that expert testimony would be 
useful to educate the jury.  This would seem to be a domain in which 
Professor Friedman’s emphasis on evidence sufficiency, helpfulness 
and jury helpfulness would support high rates of admissibility. 
 
 
Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE 10, 10-11 (1995).  
Faigman and Wright argued that, of all the Daubert factors, Battered Woman 
Syndrome would only be able to satisfy the general acceptance requirement and that 
it is not helpful to the trier of fact.  See Faigman & Wright, supra note 35.  Morse 
argued pre-Kumho that Battered Woman Syndrome is not scientific testimony and 
would not be evaluated under the Daubert factors.  Instead, the qualifications of the 
expert, the relevance, and the assistance provided to the trier of fact by the expert 
testimony should determine the admissibility of syndrome testimony.  Allison Morse, 
Social Science in the Courtroom: Expert Testimony and Battered Women, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 
287, 295-12 (1998). 
 57 Similar to Kassin and Barndollar, Kovera and Borgida also surveyed jurors and 
compared their responses to experts.  Experts in child sexual abuse were surveyed on 
the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders, the typical behaviors of 
victims, the typical characteristics of offenders, the cognitive capacity of child victims, 
and the typical correlates of abuse.  Laypersons’ responses did not correspond to 
expert responses on measures relating to children’s memories, the lack of offender 
information, and the typical responses to sexual abuse victimization.  Expert 
testimony could inform potential jurors on these issues as information the expert 
possessed was outside the common knowledge of the laypersons.  Margaret B. Kovera 
& Eugene Borgida, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Trials: The Admissibility of 
Psychological Science, 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 105, 108-12 (1997). 
In addition to investigations of the common knowledge of jurors about 
eyewitness reliability and child sexual abuse, research also has been conducted on 
jurors’ knowledge of rape.  Frazier and Borgida gave the Sexual Assault 
Questionnaire (SAQ), a questionnaire designed to measure knowledge about rape, 
and seven additional items drawn from actual cases determining the admissibility of 
rape trauma syndrome to expert social workers, undergraduates, and university staff.  
Non-experts scored lower on the SAQ than experts, indicating that the non-experts 
had less knowledge about rape than the experts.  Non-experts’ lacked knowledge 
about the likely victims of rape, and non-experts demonstrated more endorsement of 
rape myths.  However, non-experts were knowledgeable about the definition of rape, 
the frequency of rape, the reluctance for victims to report rape, and rape recovery.  
The authors concluded that expert testimony or jury instructions would be useful to 
educate the non-experts about those measures on which they demonstrated a lack of 
general knowledge.  Patricia Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Juror Common Understanding 
and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. (1988). 
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D.  Future Research Directions 
The limitations and results of this research suggest several future 
research directions.  Because of the selection bias in our data, it 
could be argued that the results are not representative of trial court 
decision making as a whole.  Therefore, a similar systematic, 
empirical examination of trial court opinions is recommended.  
These results could be compared to the results of our research to 
provide a fuller picture of judicial decision-making about expert 
testimony.  The results of the small body of past research on judges’ 
abilities to evaluate scientific evidence are consistent with their 
apparent lack of reliance on reliability as an admission criterion.  
Because of these findings, more empirical research on judicial 
abilities to evaluate reliability should be undertaken.  Empirical 
research investigating judges’ reasoning in the admission of police 
officers and psychologists would further illuminate the distinctions 
courts are making between these two types of testimony. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Daubert and Kumho decisions attempted to provide the 
appropriate standards for judges to determine the admissibility of 
expert testimony, and yet these decisions also raised many questions 
about the applications of these standards to expert testimony.  In 
particular, concerns arise about the appropriateness of a differential 
application of these standards to different types of expert testimony.  
An examination of police officers and psychologists provides 
evidence that some testimony is held to very exacting standards and 
other testimony is admitted with very little scrutiny.  In general, 
courts appear to be proceeding in a manner consistent with 
Friedman’s arguments.  They are definitely focusing on whether the 
testimony assists the trier of fact and whether the expert is qualified.  
In addition, reliability is far from the final word in the analysis of 
admissibility.  In fact, the research presented here indicates that 
reliability is not a consideration at all in the admission decision.  
Although these results are consistent with well reasoned legal 
arguments, the sharp distinction between police and psychologists in 
the absence of a reliability analysis is disconcerting.  Even relying on 
helpfulness, courts may be making decisions that are inconsistent 
with the informational needs of the factfinder, the opinions of the 
experts on the need for their testimony, and the extent of our 
knowledge about the reliability of their respective testimonies.  The 
fact that the appropriateness of the standards that are being used 
depends on the perspective taken indicates that the reasons for these 
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distinctions need to be evaluated further.  This is a clear call for 
further research into judicial decision making about expert testimony 
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Note: Ratings of importance of each knowledge source on a scale of 
0-9, with 0 = never mentioned, 1 = not at all important, and 9 = the 
most important.  Experience was significantly more important for 
police officers than for either type of psychologist, F(2,653) = 21.08, p 
< .001.  Case specific experience was significantly less important for 
experimental psychologists than for both police and clinical 
psychologists, F(2,653) = 5.80, p < .001.  Education was more 
important for experimental psychologists than for clinical 
psychologists and police, and it was more important for clinical 
psychologists than for police, F(2,652) = 815.36, p < .001.  Reliance on 
a body of research was more important for experimental 
psychologists than for clinical psychologists and police, and it was 
more important for clinical psychologists than for police, F(2,654) = 
148.49, p < .001.  Theory was equally important for both types of 
psychologists, but it was more important for clinical psychologists 








 2003 STANDARDS FOR EXPERTS IN CRIMINAL CASES 1163 



































































































Note.  Significant differences among the types of testimony were 
observed for assisting the trier of fact, X
2
 (2) = 23.63, V = .19, p < .001, 
qualifications, X
2
 (2) = 27.76, V = .21, p < .001, and prejudicial impact, 
X
2
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FIGURE 3: PERCENTAGE OF CASES STATING THE CRITERIA WERE NOT 




































Note.  Significant differences among the types of testimony were 
observed for assisting the trier of fact, X
2
 (2) = 107.17, V = .40, p < 
.001, relevance, X
2
 (2) = 32.27, V = .22, p < .001, reliability, X
2
 (2) = 
18.0, V = .17, p < .001, general acceptance, X
2
 (2) = 14.63, V = .15, p < 
.01, and peer review, X
2
 (2) = 7.87, V = .11, p < .05.  All other 
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Table 1: Admission Rates for Prosecution and Defense Experts 
 

































  Police officers were significantly more likely to be admitted when 
testifying for the prosecution, X
2
 (1) = 101.72, V = .62, p < 001. 
b
  Clinical psychologists were significantly more likely to be admitted 
when testifying for the prosecution, X
2
 (1) = 67.95, V = .47, p < 001. 
c
  Experimental psychologists were not significantly more likely to be 
admitted when testifying for the prosecution, X
2
 (1) = 1.96, V = .17, p 
> .05. 
d  Experimental psychologists were not significantly more likely to be 
admitted when testifying for the prosecution, X
2
 (1) = 358.50, V = .55, 
p < .001. 
 
